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Kantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue 
of accommodating two plausible intuitions: that the praiseworthiness of an action is never 
accidental, and that how an agent might have acted in other circumstances does not determine 
the moral worth of her actual conduct. In this paper, I argue that neither the Kantian nor her 
rivals can adequately accommodate both intuitions inasmuch as non-accidentality presupposes 
counterfactual robustness. If we are to adequately accommodate both claims, then we must 
reconsider the kind of non-accidentality that really matters to moral worth. I propose that the 
kind of non-accidentality worth caring about requires only that the agent who does what is right 
act competently from morally relevant concerns. Under this account, both the Kantian and 
(some of) her rivals can ensure that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental without 
counting the behaviour of non-actual agents as relevant to assessments of moral worth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Few passages in moral philosophy are better known than the following one [Kant 1785: 4: 
390]: 
 
In the case of what is to be morally good it is not enough that [the action] conform with 
the moral law but it must also be done for the sake of the law; without this that conformity 
is only very contingent and precarious, since a ground that is not moral will indeed now 
and then produce actions in conformity with the law, but it will also often produce actions 
contrary to law.  
 
Kant’s claim here is, at its core, a claim concerning moral motivation; it tells us something 
important about the motivational profile that lies behind the scenes of morally worthy actions. 
On Kant’s view, such actions must be carried out not only in conformity with, but for the sake 
of the moral law; the agent must act from the motive of duty. Were she motivated merely by 
sympathy or compassion, then her acting rightly would be ‘precarious’ and ‘contingent’; such 
motives could very well lead her to act contrary to morality’s demands.  
Although these remarks have earned Kant a fair share of bad press, many find the basic line 
of argument compelling. The following view in particular has gained a remarkable number of 
contemporary sponsors: 
The Kantian view: A right action has moral worth iff the agent acts from the motive of 
duty.1 
1 There is decent textual evidence that Kant takes the motive of duty to be necessary and sufficient for moral 
worth (see Stratton-Lake [2000: 48]). Whether or not this is a wise move on his behalf is a question that I take 
up in section 3.2.  
1 
 
                                                        
Moral worth, as it is commonly understood, concerns whether (or the degree to which) an agent 
is praiseworthy for acting rightly.2 When we ascribe moral worth to an action, we don’t only 
mean to claim that it was the right thing to do.3 The action must be performed for the right 
kinds of reasons; a particular motive is (or motives are) needed to endow it with moral worth. 
The Kantian view identifies a candidate motive; it tells us that the agent must act from duty. 
As it is sometimes put in more common parlance, acts of moral worth must stem from a concern 
to do what is right.4  
My foremost ambition in this paper will be to show that the Kantian view does not have 
quite as much going for it as contemporary discussions would appear to suggest. The position 
is commonly thought to have an advantage over its rivals in virtue of satisfying two important 
desiderata. First, the Kantian view appears to satisfy what I shall call the non-accidentality 
constraint; it accommodates the highly intuitive idea that morally worthy actions are non-
accidentally right. It is therefore said to fare better than proposals that take sympathetic 
motives—which may or may not issue in right action, depending upon good fortune—to suffice 
for moral worth [Herman 1981: 364-6; Sliwa 2016: 396-8]. Second, the Kantian view appears 
to satisfy what I will dub the pertinence constraint; it counts as relevant to assessments of moral 
worth only the motives that actually led the agent to act as she did. So it is thought to enjoy an 
advantage over proposals that (wrongly) take facts about how an agent would have acted in 
other possible circumstances to determine her praiseworthiness [Sliwa 2016: 399-400]. 
In what follows, I shall argue that appearances here are misleading; the Kantian view does 
not in fact enjoy this advantage over its rivals. I will begin by saying a little more about the 
Kantian view and its competitors (section 2). Following that, I argue that neither the Kantian 
nor her rivals can serve two masters (section 3). In their attempts to satisfy the non-accidentality 
constraint, they inevitably run afoul of the pertinence constraint (if not in letter, then at least in 
spirit). The problem is, I suggest, owing to the common assumption that non-accidentality 
requires an agent’s acting rightly to be counterfactually robust, given her motives. I shall 
contend that the kind of non-accidentality worth caring about requires something far less 
demanding of the agent who acts rightly: that she do so competently from morally relevant 
concerns (section 4). This revised understanding not only solves the problem at hand, but also 
suggests that satisfying both constraints is not merely the province of the Kantian. I conclude 
by reflecting upon the implications of my proposal for ascriptions of moral worth (section 5). 
 
2. The Kantian view: friends and foes 
 
The Kantian view has an impressive fan base (see, for example, Herman [1981]; Baron [1984]; 
Benson [1987]; Jeske [1998]; Sliwa [2016]). Much of the appeal, I suspect, derives from the 
intuitive idea that praiseworthy actions must issue from motives of an appropriate sort. It is 
2 Following others (e.g. Sliwa [2016]), I understand ‘right action’ broadly here. I mean to refer not only 
to actions that are morally required, but to those that are supererogatory as well. 
3 Traditionally, only right actions are taken to be candidates for moral worth (see Herman [1981: 366]; 
Benson [1987: 367]; cf. Markovits [2010: 240-1]). Though we may be less blameworthy (if at all) when 
noble motives lead us to act wrongfully, having one’s heart in the right place does not suffice. The road to 
hell has no moral worth—whether or not it is paved with good intentions. 
4 I intend for talk of desires or concerns to do what is right to be read as de dicto attitude attributions; 
the agent desires to do what is right, whatever that may be.  
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commonly recognised that any plausible moral theory must reserve an important role for 
motives—particularly so in assessments of moral worth. (Crude moral behaviourism is not in 
fashion, if ever it was.) But of course, not any motives will do. An adequate theory of moral 
worth cannot applaud ulterior motives. If acts of kindness are to have moral worth, then an 
agent cannot perform them merely to increase her social capital. And the motive of duty 
certainly does not strike one as an ulterior motive. On the contrary, it seems a very natural 
candidate for the kind of motive that would endow an action with moral worth.  
A more commonly cited motivation for the Kantian view is that it satisfies the non-
accidentality constraint. Doing so is important. If my fortuitous position beneath a balcony 
breaks your fall, then I am surely not deserving of moral praise. Nor am I to praise if I 
intentionally save you merely for self-interested reasons—because you owe me money, say. In 
the latter case, it is no accident that I come to your rescue. But given my motives, it is an 
accident that I do what is right. The motive of duty, by contrast, invests an agent with an interest 
in the rightness of her action, and so, her acting rightly would seem to be a non-accidental 
effect of her motives [Herman 1981: 366]. 
The Kantian view also appears to satisfy the pertinence constraint. If an agent is to be 
praiseworthy for having acting rightly, the Kantian requires that she acted from a concern to 
do what is right. There is no need to consider how she would have acted in similar situations. 
This seems to be the right result. We wouldn’t plausibly withhold praise from a dog-lover who 
risked her life to save a group of strangers simply because had her dog been in danger, she 
would have saved the dog instead [Markovits 2010: 210]. Counterfactual considerations such 
as these are commonly thought to be irrelevant in deciding whether agents are praiseworthy for 
their actual behaviour. To accord them any such determining role is to conflate moral worth (a 
property that attaches to dutiful actions for which an agent is praiseworthy) with moral virtue 
(which concerns an agent’s overall moral character) [Herman 1981: 369; Smith 1991: 289-90; 
Markovits 2010: 240].  
Before turning my attention to rival proposals, I should note that the Kantian view comes in 
different guises. Kant himself is sometimes saddled (perhaps uncharitably) with the view that 
the motive of duty must be present to the exclusion of all other motives if an action is to have 
moral worth. But quite a few allow that other motives—love or sympathetic concern, say—can 
happily co-exist alongside the motive of duty [Herman 1981; Baron 1984; Jeske 1998]. Still, it 
is debatable just how much heavy-lifting the motive of duty must do if an action is to be morally 
praiseworthy. In the ensuing discussion, I will engage with those who regard the motive of duty 
as a primary motive. These theorists require that the motive of duty be present at the time of 
deliberation, and that it directly explain or determine why the agent acts as she does [Herman 
1981; Jeske 1998; Sliwa 2016].5 
The Kantian view is not the only game in town. A respected handful of philosophers deny 
that the motive of duty is needed to endow actions with moral worth. Their chief complaint 
against the Kantian view is that it is unacceptably narrow; we seem to recognise a great many 
actions as morally worthy that do not have duty at their source. To tread a little more upon an 
already well-trodden example, consider Mark Twain’s Huck Finn. Huck regards slavery as a 
5 Others require only that the motive of duty function as a secondary motive —as a regulating, 
background motive that constrains one’s conduct [Baron 1984; Benson 1987; Stratton-Lake 2000]. I put 
this possibility to the side for the purposes of this paper, and leave a proper discussion of it for another 
occasion. 
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form of ownership, and so, famously suffers from a guilty conscience when he fails to turn in 
his friend Jim, a slave whom he helps to escape. In helping Jim, Huck acts contrary to what he 
takes to be his duty. Yet it is highly intuitive to suppose that Huck is praiseworthy for acting 
as he does; for he seems to act for the right kinds of reasons—compassion, concern, and an 
appreciation of another person’s value [Arpaly 2002: 230; Markovits 2010: 208]. 
These dissenters also have something positive to say about morally worthy actions. The 
central point of departure lies in an emphasis upon the right-making features of an action, as 
opposed to its rightness per se. Julia Markovits [2010: 205], for example, takes an agent to be 
praiseworthy just in case she does the right thing for the reasons in virtue of which it is right. 
If my saving a child from a burning house is to have moral worth, then I must be motivated by 
the considerations that explain why this is the right thing to do—that the child needs my help, 
and that her life has value, say. In what follows, I will refer to this proposal as the responding 
view: 
 
The responding view: A right action has moral worth iff the agent is motivated by its 
right making features. 
 
This proposal has also been advanced by Nomy Arpaly [2002], who adds to it a further 
condition that determines degrees of praiseworthiness. In Arpaly’s view, the degree to which 
an agent is praiseworthy for having acted rightly is determined by the strength of her ‘moral 
concern’; that is, by the extent to which she is disposed to respond to morally relevant 
considerations [2002: 233-5; 2003: 87].6 An agent with a ‘persistent devotion to moral issues 
even in hard times’, for example, is, ceteris paribus, more praiseworthy for having acted rightly 
than one who is not so persistently devoted. Call this the dispositional view: 
 
The dispositional view: A right action has moral worth iff the agent is motivated by its 
right-making features, and it has greater moral worth the more strongly disposed she is 
to be motivated by such right-making features. 
 
Notice that the dispositional view takes an agent’s dispositions to be relevant only for the 
purposes of deciding how praiseworthy she is. What I shall call the strong dispositional view 
takes an agent’s dispositions to be relevant for the purposes of deciding whether she is 
praiseworthy at all: 
 
The strong dispositional view: A right action has moral worth to the extent that the agent 
is disposed to be motivated by its right-making features. 
 
On this latter view, an agent’s praiseworthiness is a matter of her general responsiveness to 
morally relevant considerations. An advocate of this proposal might take moral worth to be 
something that comes in degrees; the greater the agent’s responsiveness, the greater the moral 
6  Moral concern, on Arpaly’s understanding, is a concern for morally relevant considerations (e.g. that 
someone needs help) rather than a concern for morality per se. It is also possible to understand moral 
concern as the categorical basis of particular dispositions—say, an agent’s general commitment to moral 
causes. The arguments in what follows do not hang upon either interpretation. 
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worth of her actions. Or, she might stipulate a threshold of responsiveness that must be cleared 
before an action can be a candidate for moral worth. Although (to my knowledge) neither 
variety of the strong dispositional view has earned a contemporary sponsor, the proposal will 
serve us well later on for the purposes of comparison. 
Before proceeding, I should note that these rival views typically come attached with the 
qualification that the praiseworthy agent be motivated by right-making features non-
instrumentally. It clearly won’t do if an agent is motivated by morally relevant considerations 
in an instrumental way; if she is only motivated to help someone in order that she may be 
branded a hero afterwards, say. She must rather value the end of helping this person for its own 
sake [Arpaly 2003: 84; Markovits 2010: 230]. Though I will mostly omit this qualification for 
ease of expression in what follows, I will intend for talk of being motivated by right-making 
features to be read as talk of being motivated in the relevant non-instrumental fashion. 
 
3. The difficulty of serving two masters 
 
The rival proposals canvassed above strike me as strong contenders. However, proponents of 
the Kantian view have declared them inadequate. Both the responding view and the 
dispositional view have been criticised for failing to accommodate the non-accidental character 
of morally worthy actions. While the strong dispositional view is not vulnerable to this 
criticism, it is said to fall short of satisfying the pertinence constraint. As we shall see, Kantians 
have alerted us to a substantial problem here. However, it is not a problem from which they 
themselves are completely immune. I shall argue that they too run afoul of the pertinence 
constraint in important respects in their efforts to secure non-accidentality. 
 
3.1 The case against helpful motives 
 
Proponents of the Kantian view deny that helpful motives are sufficient to endow actions with 
moral worth. Although someone who acts from such motives may very well do what is right, 
this is alleged to be wholly accidental. Suppose—to slightly modify an example from Barbara 
Herman [1981: 364-5] —that I spot an artist struggling to lift her painting outside the local 
museum. Since I desire to help, I quickly rush to give her a hand. I have acted rightly. Yet 
Herman argues that my doing so is a matter of sheer luck. I was, she suggests, just as likely to 
help a struggling artist as a struggling art thief. 
Paulina Sliwa [2016: 398] voices a similar worry. She invites us to consider Jean, who does 
the right thing—giving a friend a lift to an important meeting—for the relevant right-making 
reason: that doing so saves the friend a great embarrassment. Since Jean simply desired to spare 
her friend an embarrassment, Sliwa argues that it is a fluke that she did what was right. What 
would have happened, she asks, if the only way to spare her friend a great embarrassment had 
been for Jean to kill this friend’s ex-boyfriend? It seems to be a matter of moral serendipity 
that Jean did not find herself in the latter situation. Thus, Sliwa concludes that Jean’s acting 
rightly was accidental—ergo, her action has no moral worth. 
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Now, there is a concern with the accidentality challenge as formulated.7 It seems slightly 
unfair to infer from someone’s desiring to help an artist or a friend that they would help just 
anyone under any circumstances. That strikes me as a considerable leap; for very few people 
plausibly have helpful desires that are so woefully indiscriminating. I’d gladly help a friend to 
set up her new computer, but it doesn’t follow that I’d gladly help her to set off a nuclear bomb. 
So the worry (if it is to be worrying) cannot be that if some individual desires to help ordinary 
person A in circumstances C1, then she is very likely to help evil, scheming person B in 
circumstances C2. The real worry, I take it, is not that this is likely to happen, but that we are 
offered no assurance that it would not. 
The accidentality challenge would seem to have force against the responding view and 
(though perhaps to a lesser extent) the dispositional view.8 Both proposals take an agent’s being 
motivated by the right-making features of her action to be necessary and sufficient for moral 
worth. Yet helpful desires seem problematically precarious in that they render right action 
hostage to good fortune; given such motives, an agent’s moral conduct cannot be declared 
suitably robust. 
However, these arguments carry little if any force against the strong dispositional view. (I 
shall assume the threshold variety for illustrative purposes.) If Jean is disposed to kill someone 
to save her friend an embarrassment, then (presumably) she is not properly responsive to 
morally relevant considerations, and so, is not praiseworthy at all. But if Jean is only disposed 
to save her friend an embarrassment when doing so wouldn’t significantly harm anyone else, 
then she would seem properly responsive to morally relevant considerations. Given this, it is 
no accident that she does what is right, and she is a proper candidate for moral praise. 
Yet in its attempts to evade the accidentality problem, the strong dispositional view violates 
the pertinence constraint. Sliwa [2016: 399-400] contends (and I agree) that these 
counterfactual facts about Jean are not relevant to her praiseworthiness.9 When we ask whether 
Jean’s helping her friend has moral worth, we are only interested in the motivations that 
actually led her to respond as she did—we are not interested in her general responsiveness to 
morally relevant considerations. The strong dispositional view would seem to conflate moral 
worth with moral virtue. 
 
3.2 The best of both worlds? 
 
There is something puzzling about the criticisms that the Kantian directs against her rivals. One 
is not permitted to appeal to an agent’s dispositions; for doing so builds in counterfactual facts 
that seem irrelevant in assessing the moral worth of her conduct. Yet one must do something 
to ensure that the agent’s acting rightly is no accident. And non-accidentality seems to require 
some measure of counterfactual robustness. Given this, the temptation to appeal to 
counterfactual facts is quite understandable. 
7 I am indebted to Gerald Lang for very helpful feedback here. 
8 The dispositional view can at least accommodate the idea that Jean is not very praiseworthy. If she 
really is disposed to kill someone to help her friend, then, presumably, she is not terribly responsive to 
morally relevant considerations. 
9 This may also present a problem for the dispositional view if one also regards these counterfactual 
facts as irrelevant to her degree of praiseworthiness. 
6 
 
                                                        
Indeed, one feels compelled to ask how the Kantian herself proposes to navigate a happy 
middle path between the horns of irrelevancy and accidentality. Upon reflection, it is not 
obvious that she can. As Thomas Hurka [2014] points out, Herman’s criticism of helpful 
motives would seem to have equal force against the motive of duty if that motive is simply 
construed as a desire to do what is right. The motive of duty, so construed, is no guarantor of 
right action. A Kantian agent may very well abet Herman’s art thief; for she may (falsely) 
believe that her duties to help others take priority over any duties to respect property rights. A 
natural fix (and Hurka [2014: 497] suggests, what it may be charitable to take Herman to be 
assuming) is that ‘a Kantian agent knows and is motivated by her duty’. 
The idea that praiseworthy agents act from what they know to be their duty is not merely a 
helpful piece of exegesis. Sliwa [2016: 394] has recently proposed to understand an agent’s 
acting from duty in terms of her being motivated to do the right thing by both a concern to do 
what is right, and ‘by knowledge that it is the right thing to do’. The touted virtue of Sliwa’s 
proposal is that it promises to secure [2016: 400-1]: 
…a counterfactually stable link between an agent’s actual motivation and her right 
action… if an agent knows that an action is the right thing to do, then it is the right thing 
to do and she could not have easily been mistaken about it’s being the right thing to do.  
Clearly, this variant of the Kantian view (hereafter, the knowledge view) satisfies the non-
accidentality constraint. But does it satisfy the pertinence constraint? Matters here are not so 
straightforward.10 
The knowledge view would seem to satisfy the letter of the pertinence constraint. If an 
agent’s acting rightly is to have moral worth, then we need only require that she act from moral 
knowledge and a concern to do what is right. On the other hand, knowledge plausibly requires 
some sort of counterfactual stability. So the knowledge view will demand something of 
praiseworthy agents counterfactually as well as actually. Given this, it is difficult to shake the 
niggling worry that the proposal goes against the spirit—even if not the letter—of the 
pertinence constraint. 
Upon reflection, this turns out to be more than a niggling worry; for it strikes me that the 
pertinence constraint has an important additional purpose aside from that of helping us to 
prevent counterfactual considerations from infecting our assessments of moral worth. It is for 
this reason that I believe that the knowledge view does go against the spirit of the pertinence 
constraint. (And unfortunately for the knowledge view, the spirit matters in this case.) In order 
to properly articulate these concerns, it will be helpful to reflect upon why the concept of moral 
worth is important to us.11 
There is widespread agreement that moral worth is distinct from moral virtue. But an 
important connection is often thought to hold between the two. Morally worthy actions are said 
to be the ‘…building blocks of virtue —a pattern of performing them makes up the life of a 
good person’ [Markovits 2010: 203]. I am inclined to side with the majority on both counts. 
But I also feel that there is more to be said. We have a number of reasons for wanting the 
conceptual resources to single out right actions that issue from the right motives. 
10 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for helping me to see this. 
11 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing upon me the need to do so. 
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To begin with, we do not only value moral worth as a means of achieving virtue. We value 
morally worthy actions non-instrumentally as well. We value there being acts of kindness and 
generosity in the world, and we do not only value these states of affairs in so far as they translate 
into more kind and generous people. Further, good states of affairs often come about as the 
result of human action; the sick are cheered up by visits from charismatic electoral candidates, 
vegan-friendly products are promoted by profit-driven companies. But only some good states 
of affairs that result from human action strike us as moral achievements, and thus, worthy of 
singling out; those that come from the right place. 
Moreover, and importantly, these moral achievements are not only the province of those on 
the path to virtue. They are also to be found on the path to redemption. Morally defective agents 
can plausibly be contenders for moral praise (even if they will only ever reach bare moral 
decency). Indeed, acknowledging this is often an important part of their re-entry into the moral 
community. Nor do morally worthy actions seem restricted to seasoned moralisers. Children 
don’t usually have a great deal of moral insight. But many arguably do have enough to be 
fitting candidates for moral praise. 
I am now in a position to explain why I do not believe that the knowledge view satisfies the 
spirit of the pertinence constraint. A core purpose of the pertinence constraint, I want to 
propose, is to prevent an account of moral worth from being unacceptably demanding. If we 
set the bar too high, then it becomes increasingly difficult not only to retain distinct categories 
of moral worth and moral virtue (the latter being something that plausibly does require 
robustness), but also to acknowledge the moral accomplishments of a wide array of moral 
agents, with varying degrees of moral insight and commitment—something which, I have 
suggested, we should want our concept of moral worth to do. In so far as one’s account renders 
morally worthy actions counterfactually robust, it risks rendering praiseworthy agents far rarer 
than we take them to be. Indeed, this is precisely why I believe that the knowledge view delivers 
the wrong results in a variety of cases; it is because it makes the conditions for praiseworthiness 
far too demanding. 
To illustrate my concerns, consider the following case. Suppose that John spots a drowning 
child in the ocean, and that though he is morally required to save her, he does not know this. 
(This is not to suggest that John is morally clueless; he is simply unsure as to whether his saving 
the child would amount to violating certain duties that he has to himself.) Being slightly more 
(justifiably) confident that the moral law requires him to come to the child’s rescue, John jumps 
into the ocean and successfully retrieves her. The proponent of the knowledge view must deny 
that John’s action has moral worth.12 But this seems harsh. John was deeply concerned to do 
what was right—so concerned that he was willing to take on significant personal risk in the 
course of fulfilling his moral duties.   
In fairness to Sliwa, she does do some work to address the concern that the knowledge view 
is ungenerous and over-demanding. Consider her example of Peter, who unwittingly donates 
to a charity that exacerbates famine problems (despite his best efforts and noble motives). 
Although Peter is not praiseworthy for donating to this charity, Sliwa contends that he can 
nonetheless be praiseworthy for donating a portion of his income, and for following expert 
advice (on the assumption that he is motivated to perform these intermediate actions by a 
12 I take it for granted here that an agent who is only slightly more confident that p than that not p (where p is 
true) does not know that p. But the basic point does not stand or fall with this particular case. As I will later 
argue, acting rightly from justified beliefs does not seem to disqualify one from moral praise. 
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concern to do what is right, and knows them to be morally right). As Sliwa [2016: 403] 
observes, ‘…most actions are complex’, and so, ‘…agents who perform some morally wrong 
action may, at the same time, perform actions that are morally right’. 
Yet I worry that this strategy will only get the knowledge view so far. John’s action does 
not seem particularly complex; he simply sees a child drowning and saves her. There aren’t 
many natural contenders for intermediate actions here, and so, it is difficult to see what (if 
anything) we could praise John for if not for saving the child. 
Of course, in principle we can cut things down as finely as we wish. Perhaps John pinpoints 
the child’s location, then swims in her direction, and then retrieves her. Is John at least 
praiseworthy for these intermediate actions? If he is not, then the knowledge view starts to look 
ungenerous once again. If he is, then the verdict now seems to be that John is praiseworthy for 
scanning the ocean, for swimming in the child’s direction, but not for saving the child. Yet this 
verdict strikes me as both odd (is saving the child not what we would be most inclined to praise 
John for?), and arbitrary. It’s easy to see why we ought to stop short of praising Peter for 
donating to a charity that exacerbates famine; after all, that’s morally wrong. But it’s not at all 
clear why we should stop short of praising John, who acted rightly. And I wager that many of 
us would not be inclined to stop short of praising John. Our practices of lending praise seem to 
me to be far more generous than the knowledge view allows. Clearly, something has to give. 
And in my view, it is the assumption that counterfactual robustness is needed for moral worth. 
 
4. Non-accidentality reconsidered 
 
If we are to move forward, then it will be helpful to diagnose how we came to find ourselves 
in this unhappy situation. The error, I will suggest, lies in mistaking the importance of what 
counterfactual truths can reveal for the importance of counterfactual truths themselves. This 
diagnosis gains plausibility once we reflect upon why particular sorts of cases seem to count in 
favour of the pertinence constraint, whereas others seem to support a counterfactual robustness 
reading of non-accidentality. 
Consider first the sorts of cases that motivate the pertinence constraint. Suppose that I dive 
into dangerous rapids to rescue my pet poodle, and that upon my return to the river bank, you 
deny that I am praiseworthy for my heroics. ‘After all’, you explain, ‘you wouldn’t have 
jumped in had your dog been a heavier one—a Great Dane, say.’ Your counterfactual claim 
may very well be correct. But your moral assessment is surely not. Facts about my choice of 
dog breed in other possible worlds do not seem to bear upon the moral worth of my conduct.  
Yet sometimes counterfactual facts do appear to affect assessments of moral worth. Suppose 
now that upon my return to the river bank, you had instead claimed, ‘Your action has no moral 
worth. After all, you wouldn’t have jumped in had no one been watching.’ What is 
counterfactually true of me in this case certainly does seem to impact upon my action’s moral 
worth. 
However, I want to suggest that appearances here are misleading. Although the latter 
counterfactual is tracking something important, what is important is not the counterfactual truth 
per se. What is important is what it suggests to us about my actual motives: they fail to pick up 
on what is morally relevant. If I wouldn’t have helped my dog in the absence of an audience, 
then it would seem that the consideration that she needed help, or the fact that saving her was 
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the right thing to do, were wholly beside the point for me. What I was really seeking, it seems, 
were the moral accolades. 
When I am motivated to save my pet by a selfish desire for acclaim, it is indeed accidental 
that I act rightly. But in order to accommodate this verdict, we need not appeal to the 
counterfactual truth that had there been no one around to do any acclaiming, there would have 
been no poodle-saving. What we can instead appeal to is something that is lacking in my actual 
motives. Saving my poodle is the right thing to do, and what makes it right (in part) is that her 
life has value. But neither of these things has anything to do with my saving the poodle; for 
neither play any role in explaining why I acted as I did. What I saw in the action was the 
prospect of earning acclaim; something which was quite clearly irrelevant to what I was 
required to do.  
What I want to propose, then, is that the kind of non-accidentally that truly matters for moral 
worth requires that the agent be (non-instrumentally) motivated by morally relevant concerns. 
And the case above (along with others) suggests to me that neither a concern for rightness nor 
a concern for right-making features ought to strike us as morally irrelevant. We should not 
want to say of me that had I been motivated by the fact that saving my pet is the right thing to 
do, or by the fact that her life has value, then I would have been motivated by something that 
was, morally speaking, beside the point. I therefore propose that we adopt a moderate pluralism 
on the matter of what is morally relevant. 
However, morally relevant concerns alone won’t do. To see why, consider a case of the 
following sort. Suppose that Cara is wholly unsure as to whether or not she has any duty to 
donate to famine relief, and flips a coin to decide (tails for ‘yes’, heads for ‘no’). Very much 
desiring (de dicto) to do her duty, Cara acts in line with the coin’s result—no questions asked, 
no reasons needed. Intuitively (and assuming that the coin lands tails, and that Cara does indeed 
donate to famine relief) her moral success is accidental. But the issue cannot be that she is 
moved by morally irrelevant concerns. The issue rather has to do with the manner in which 
Cara brings about the right action. Since she anticipates the verdicts of a coin to be more reliable 
than her own, she would seem to have little if any insight into what makes her action right. It 
therefore seems wrong to characterise the donation as an achievement on her behalf. 
Something more is clearly needed if a right action is to count as a moral achievement for 
which an agent can be praiseworthy. In what follows, I shall fill in this gap by drawing upon 
(certain aspects of) Gwen Bradford’s [2015] promising account of achievement, which requires 
that the relevant outcome be something that the agent competently brings about. Before we 
attend to the finer details here, though, I think it will be helpful to have what I take to be the 
right conception of non-accidentality on the table: 
Non-accidentality*: A right action is non-accidental in the sense that is relevant to 
determining its moral worth iff the agent acts from a non-instrumental concern for its 
rightness or its right-making features, and it is something that she competently brings 
about qua right action, or qua action with right-making features. 
 
Two quick points of clarification. First, I intend for ‘determining’ to be read in a 
metaphysical and not (merely) an epistemic sense; I mean to refer to what grounds moral 
worth—not only to what is needed for us to ascertain whether particular actions have it.13 
13 I thank an anonymous referee for helpful feedback on this point. 
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Second, the ‘or’ is inclusive; one may very well act from a non-instrumental concern for the 
rightness of the action and from a non-instrumental concern for its right-making features. (In 
some such cases, one’s conduct will be overdetermined.14) 
We can now consider what is needed for an outcome is to be something that an agent 
competently brings about. As Bradford [2015: 20] observes, competently bringing it about that 
p requires more than playing some causal role. P must be ‘competently caused’—it must be 
properly creditable to the agent’s competent performance. As to what is involved in bringing 
about p in a competent manner, I follow Bradford [2015: 65] in thinking that what is needed is 
(relevant) justified beliefs; that is, the agent must have justified beliefs about the action that she 
is performing.15 Moreover, and on my understanding, competently bringing it about that p need 
not entail having an impressive repertoire of skills or expertise with respect to p. An individual 
can, for example, plausibly argue for a moral conclusion in a competent manner on a particular 
occasion without being a moral philosopher, and without being especially skilled at 
argumentation more generally.16 Finally, and as non-accidentality* anticipates, agents may act 
competently under some descriptions, but not others. John for example, may competently bring 
about the saving of the child qua right action (in so far as he is justified in believing saving the 
child to be morally right), but not qua feat of swimming (perhaps John is an awful swimmer, 
and the rescue mission is something of a slog). It is only the first that is of moral consequence. 
We can now see what was missing in the coin-flip case. Though Cara acted rightly from 
morally relevant concerns, she failed to do so in a competent manner; for she was not justified 
in believing that she was acting rightly. Thus, Kantian agents cannot merely act from a desire 
to do what is right if their acting rightly is to be non-accidental; they must also be justified in 
believing their actions to be right. Similar lessons apply to those who are motivated by the 
right-making features of their actions. Such agents must plausibly be justified in believing that 
they ought to act as they do (for example, to extend help). Justification may result from 
normative reflection, or from something less intellectual—compassion, say. This qualification 
rules out those who lack any insight into what matters in the case at hand, and act on mere 
whim.17 
Indeed, many of the proposals canvassed in section 2 are plausibly interpreted as assuming 
that praiseworthy agents have justified beliefs in this vein. Markovits [2010: 219] characterises 
the praiseworthy agent as one who does what she has ‘sufficient epistemic reason to believe it 
would be best to do’. Likewise, some Kantians assume that agents who desire to act rightly 
14 I have neglected to discuss other sorts of cases of motivational over-determination, whereby an agent 
acts from both laudable motives and less laudable ones. Doing so would take me astray, and I do not think 
that I could do greater justice to this complex issue than Smith [1991] does in her paper-length treatment of 
it. 
15 Bradford actually speaks of justified true beliefs. I omit this feature in my own discussion because 
non-accidentality* already limits the cases of concern to right actions. Moreover, one can surely act more 
or less competently. Bradford [2015: 76] takes both the amount and value of justified true beliefs into 
account in determining degrees of competence. 
16 Put differently, acting in a competent manner need not manifest a more systematic competence (of 
the sort that interests advocates of dispositionalist views, for example). It may of course manifest a very 
specific competence that is (more or less) local to the circumstances in which the agent finds herself. But 
the latter strikes me as too weak and uninteresting to count as competence proper. 
17 I understand justification here along internalist lines. Someone whose moral beliefs were reliably 
connected to the truth but whose moral success seemed wholly accidental from her own perspective would 
not be praiseworthy in my view. I thank the editor for pointing this out. 
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have some grasp of the characteristic goals of morality [Jeske 1998]. Acting from duty need 
not amount to mere rule-following. 
One might wonder whether non-accidentality* doesn’t itself engender some form of 
counterfactual robustness.18 Perhaps morally worthy actions are counterfactually robust 
precisely in virtue of the agent acting from morally relevant concerns, and bringing about the 
outcome in a competent manner. However, I do not think this is quite right. Moral knowledge 
or understanding (see Hills [2009]) is surely sufficient for an agent to competently bring about 
a right action—as is the systematic moral sensitivity that dispositional views emphasise. But 
they are not plausibly regarded as necessary; justified beliefs suffice. The latter offer no 
assurance of counterfactual robustness. They are consistent, for example, with an agent’s 
avoiding widespread and misleading information via some sort of epistemic serendipity, with 
her failing to make the right trade-offs in very similar circumstances—and indeed, with her 
being ever so slightly more justified in believing her action to be right rather than wrong. 
Non-accidentality* has an important pay-off, and delivers an important lesson. The pay-off 
is that there is no longer any tension between our two constraints. Non-accidentality* concerns 
only an agent’s actual psychology, and so, we need not go against the pertinence constraint in 
our attempts to satisfy it. The lesson is that once we have pinned down the sort of non-
accidentality at issue, Kantian views lose their touted advantage over the responding view; 
neither proposal runs afoul of non-accidentality*. However, the Kantian’s other rivals do not 
fare quite so well. When all is said and done, the challenge for dispositional views still stands. 
In so far as their proponents demand a great deal of praiseworthy agents counterfactually, they 
continue to violate the pertinence constraint. 
 
5. Implications 
 
We should want non-accidentality* to be capable of filling the boots of its counterfactual 
predecessor. It must deliver the correct rulings, counting as accidental much of what we pre-
theoretically take to be accidental in our assessments of moral worth. I believe that it can. 
As we have seen, non-accidentality* counts right actions that result from utter moral 
cluelessness as accidentally right. It also counts actions that issue from ulterior motives as 
accidentally right. Presumably, Jean’s action would have no moral worth if she had only helped 
her friend because she had planned to ask for a loan later that day. Non-accidentality* rules 
that Jean acts rightly accidentally in this case; for she fails to act from morally relevant 
concerns. 
What non-accidentality* does not count as accidentally right is Jean’s act of helping her 
friend, where she is motivated by the consideration that doing so would save this friend an 
embarrassment. Assuming that Jean is non-instrumentally motivated to save her friend an 
embarrassment and is justified in believing that she ought to do so, she does what is right in a 
competent way. True, her motives afford no guarantee that Jean wouldn’t kill this friend’s ex-
boyfriend in other circumstances.19 But I do not believe that we should infer from this that she 
is not praiseworthy for behaving as she actually does. 
18 I thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. 
19 Helpful desires may therefore leave us with unanswered questions about an agent’s virtue. But in my 
view, this should not lead us to question her action’s moral worth. 
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Of course, nothing that I have said commits me to the claim that Jean’s action has moral 
worth. I am only committed to the claim that this is not ruled out by its being accidental. Some 
may think it a shortcoming of my proposal that it does not swiftly rule out helpful folk like 
Jean. But I myself am inclined to regard this result as a feature rather than a bug; for I think 
that we ought to give up on the idea that helpful desires are too modally fragile to endow actions 
with moral worth. This idea does not appear at all central to our practices of moral praise. 
Indeed, it seems that judgments of praiseworthiness often persist even as we wonder whether 
an agent’s motives might lead them morally astray in other circumstances. We might worry, 
for instance, that some parents seem slightly too devoted to their children, and wonder whether 
their desire to promote their children’s well-being might lead them to act wrongly in certain 
situations. (They may, for example, refuse to allow their children to incur a very small cost in 
order to greatly benefit many less fortunate children.) But this doesn’t seem to prevent us from 
judging these parents praiseworthy when they (rightly) undergo incredible sacrifice for their 
children’s sakes. Cases such as these are familiar—they are hardly idiosyncratic. And they 
strongly suggest to me that judgments of moral praise do not stand or fall with judgments of 
counterfactual robustness. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
My foremost intention has been to show that the Kantian view does not have quite as much 
going for it as is commonly advertised. If the non-accidentality constraint requires that an 
agent’s acting rightly be counterfactually robust given her motives, then it is only secured at 
the cost of failing to satisfy the pertinence constraint (whether in letter or in spirit). This 
constitutes a challenge for the Kantian as well as her rivals. In addressing this challenge, I have 
proposed that the kind of non-accidentality worth caring about only requires of the 
praiseworthy agent that she act competently from morally relevant concerns. My proposal does 
not exclude those who act competently from helpful desires from the sphere of moral praise. 
Far from being an unwelcome consequence of the view, I have argued that this is the right 
result. Few of us think it is fitting to withhold praise from someone who rushes to our side 
simply because they wish to help. This does not seem to be an appropriate way for moral agents 
to relate to one another, and nor, thankfully, is it the way they do. 
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